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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between fiscal decentralization and internal
conflict in 77 countries during the period 1972-2000. The results show that the
devolution of fiscal power to subnational tiers of government reduces the incidence
of civil conflict. This finding is robust to the inclusion in the analysis of the degree of
political decentralization and of a number of control variables commonly employed in
the literature. Likewise, the observed relationship does not depend on the estimation
strategy or the specific measures used to quantify the degree of fiscal decentralization
and the incidence of civil conflicts within the various countries.
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1 Introduction
Internal armed conflicts account for an enormous share of deaths and hardship around
the world. In addition to the direct impact on battle-related deaths, within-country
conflicts give rise to an important number of indirect deaths due to disease and mal-
nutrition, as well as the forced displacements of numerous people, causing massive
human suffering (Brown, 1996; Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). Intrastate conflicts have
also a negative impact on political stability and economic development. In particular,
intrastate violence tends to aggravate existing economic problems by reducing the
productive capacity and hampering growth. Furthermore, civil conflicts often have
important diffusion or contagion effects, which can contribute to undermine regional
stability and the relations between neighbouring countries (Sambanis, 2001). For
all these reasons, preventing internal conflicts and reducing their intensity is crucial.
Nevertheless, the design of prevention and management strategies requires a good
understanding of the causes of this type of violence. This explains the considerable
efforts devoted over the last decades to investigating the explanatory factors of civil
conflicts (see Sambanis (2002) or Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review of this
literature).
The transfers of powers and resources to subnational tiers of government have been
the subject of special attention in the debates about how to reduce the incidence of
internal conflicts. As an example, one might mention the cases of countries such as
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cyprus, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa,
or Sri Lanka, where policy makers have resorted in recent years to some form of decen-
tralized governance in order to manage the conflict between the central government
and subnational groups (Hale, 2004; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). According to the tra-
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ditional discourse, decentralization can help to reduce intrastate conflicts by bringing
the government closer to the people, increasing the opportunities of local groups to
participate in government, and providing them with institutional channels for voic-
ing their demands (Oates, 1972; Gurr, 2000; Hechter, 2000). Nevertheless, there are
also arguments that cast doubts on the effectiveness of decentralization for promoting
internal stability. Thus, some scholars point out that decentralization contributes to
promote and reinforce regional identities, increasing the cohesion of local groups, and
their willingness and capacity to act against the central government (Bunce, 1999;
Snyder, 2000; Cornell, 2002). Therefore, decentralization may increase the risks of
internal conflict and secessionism.
Most existing analyses on the link between intrastate conflict and decentralization
are based on single-country case studies (e.g. Horowitz, 1991; Lijphart, 1996; Diprose,
2009). While this approach provides undoubtedly useful information about the effec-
tiveness of devolution initiatives in reducing conflict in specific countries, it does not
allow one to extrapolate the conclusions to other countries. In contrast to the number
of single-country case studies, there are few cross-country analyses to date addressing
the link between decentralization and civil violence (see, for example, Bermeo (2002),
Bakke and Wibbels (2006) or Brancati (2006)). Nevertheless, these studies tend to
focus mainly on the impact of political decentralization, while the fiscal dimension of
decentralization has received considerably less attention (Tranchant, 2010). Against
this background, the present paper aims to extend this literature by examining the ef-
fect of fiscal decentralization in the incidence of internal armed conflicts. To that end,
I use data on 77 developed and developing countries over the period 1972-2000 (see the
Appendix for further details), making the coverage of countries substantially greater
than in previous cross-country studies on the link between fiscal decentralization and
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intrastate conflict.
It is worth noting that this type of analysis is particularly relevant in the context
of the global trend towards decentralization currently underway (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Gill, 2003, 2005). In contrast to the situation in the early 1970s, when most countries
had centralized systems of government, today “some 95 percent of democracies [...]
have elected subnational governments, and countries everywhere –large and small, rich
and poor– are devolving political, fiscal, and administrative powers to subnational tiers
of government” (World Bank, 2000, p. 107). The trend towards decentralization has
been relentless and widespread among numerous countries in the world, regardless of
their level of development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, sec-
tion 2 discusses from a theoretical perspective why fiscal decentralization may affect
intrastate conflict. Section 3 describes the measures used in the paper to quantify the
level of decentralization and the incidence of internal conflict in the various countries.
In turn, section 4 presents the empirical analysis carried out to investigate the link
between fiscal decentralization and civil violence. The final section offers the main
conclusions from the paper.
2 The relationship between fiscal decentralization and in-
ternal conflict
The number of countries transferring authority and resources to subnational tiers of
government has increased considerably over the past decades (Rodden, 2002; Rodr´ıguez-
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Pose and Gill, 2003). Although recently the proponents of devolution tend to empha-
size its economic benefits, the political rationale for decentralization has been histor-
ically based on cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Gill, 2005; Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). Following the traditional discourse, de-
centralization is envisioned as a way to safeguard regional cultures and identities and to
increase the sustainability and viability of ethnically heterogeneous states (Horowitz,
1985). For example, in Spain during the framing of the 1978 Constitution, decentral-
ization was used to increase the degree of territorial cohesion in a state where regions
and nationalities with strong political identities coexisted (Greer, 2010). Similarly, in
India the period after the independence from the United Kingdom was characterized
by a high degree of decentralization, as a reflection of its ethnic, linguistic and religious
heterogeneity (McCarten, 2003). Likewise, in Irak the 2005 Constitution established a
model of decentralized government through the devolution of authority and resources
to subnational tiers of government (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). Many other nations
around the world have carried out similar processes during the last forty years in or-
der to manage the potential conflicts between the central government and subnational
groups (Hale, 2004; Brancati, 2006). Bearing this in mind, and in a quest for empiri-
cally well-founded, stylized facts, this paper examines whether fiscal decentralization
can be an effective way to prevent internal conflict.
From a theoretical perspective, there are several reasons to believe that fiscal
decentralization and intrastate armed conflicts may be related. Nevertheless, this is
a complex relationship, as attempting to explain how the devolution of fiscal power
from central to regional and local governments affects internal stability implies to take
into account multiple factors and mechanisms that often work in opposite directions.
4
A first argument to support the positive role played by fiscal decentralization in
reducing the incidence of violence within national boundaries can be drawn from the
public finance literature. Thus, the so-called “fiscal decentralization theorem” (or
“diversification hypothesis”) explains that subnational tiers of government are more
capable than central governments to tailor the provision of public goods to the needs
of the local population due to the existence of informational advantages and a better
insight into the preferences of citizens (Tibeout, 1956; Oates, 1972). Accordingly,
in the absence of interjurisdictional spillover effects and large scale economies, fiscal
decentralization can lead to efficiency gains in the allocation of resources (Rodr´ıguez-
Pose et al., 2009). These potential benefits of fiscal decentralization are directly
related to the distance between the level of provision of public goods decided by central
government and the true preferences of local citizens. This means that the advantages
of fiscal decentralization are theoretically greater in larger and more heterogeneous
countries, where a uniform level of provision of public goods tends to be inefficient.
This reasoning suggests that fiscal centralization can lead to social unrest whether the
treatment granted by the central government to a specific region is perceived as unfair
or discriminatory by the local population, thus increasing the risk of internal conflict
and secessionism (Hechter, 2000).
This potentially negative consequence of centralized systems of government on
within-country stability may be aggravated due to the existence of political parties
with an ideology based on ethnic favouritism (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). In order to
maximize their number of votes, ethnic parties use the animosity and distrust between
the various ethnic groups to broadcast messages that target a particular ethnic group
(Glaeser, 2005). When these political parties whose basis is mostly ethnic come to
power at the national level, their main aim is to design government policies that
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allow them to adopt redistributive initiatives to improve the relative situation of their
ethnic base, which is often geographically concentrated in a specific area of the country.
Likewise, these ethnic parties have incentives to limit the production of public goods
in the country as a whole to prevent those outside of their own ethnic group from
also benefiting and getting stronger (La Porta et al., 1999). In such a setting, fiscal
centralization may exacerbate ethnic tensions, posing a threat to peace and internal
stability.
Nevertheless, the processes of fiscal devolution contribute to reduce the potential
risks of internal conflict and secessionism by giving regional and local tiers of govern-
ment greater control over their economic affairs, and providing them the opportunity
to design and implement policies of their own that take into account the preferences
of their citizens (Tranchant, 2010; Sambanis and Milanovic, 2011). Therefore, fiscal
decentralization can be used as a mechanism to avoid the permanent tyranny of the
minority by the majority and thus to enhance the viability of the state (Kyriacou,
2000; Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). In fact, decentralized countries tend to be char-
acterized generally by a higher degree of political and administrative stability (Frey
and Luechinger, 2004).
Taken together, these ideas seem to indicate that the transfer of fiscal power from
central to subnational governments should reduce the incidence of internal violence.
Nevertheless, in the literature there are also arguments that pose that fiscal devolution
can have a negative impact on intrastate conflict. For example, it should not be
overlooked that fiscal decentralization contributes to reinforce regional identities by
giving them a sense of legitimacy, which increases the relevance of regional parties with
a nationalist ideology and political movements based on claims for self-determination
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and independence (Bunce, 1999; Brancati, 2006). Indeed, a decentralized system of
government provides these groups greater opportunities to collect financial resources
and to create channels through which to mobilize the local population to engage in
conflict and secessionism. Consequently, fiscal decentralization can lead to increasing
demands for sovereignty and self-rule (Hechter, 2000), which is particularly important
in explaining the onset of internal armed conflicts. In fact, demands for sovereignty and
self-rule by groups seeking greater policy independence have caused more than a third
of all civil wars around the world since the end of the Second World War (Sambanis
and Milanovic, 2011). Moreover, fiscal decentralization can be used by policy elites
in the subnational governments to discriminate against local ethnic minorities, thus
increasing ethnic tension (Horowitz, 1991; Tranchant, 2010). In addition, it is not
obvious that national security policies designed to fight against potential insurgents
are more effective in decentralized countries. In fact, decentralization may cause
coordination problems between the different tiers of government, which may lead in
turn to an underprovision and underfinancing of public safety (Strumpf, 2002).
Furthermore, several studies show that the existence of high levels of interregional
inequality within countries (i.e. spatial inequality) increases the risk of internal armed
conflict (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Østby et al., 2009; Deiwiks et al., 2012). This is
particularly relevant in our context, as fiscal decentralization may affect regional dis-
parities. It is however difficult to specify a priori the final effect of fiscal devolution
on interregional inequality. On the one hand, fiscal decentralization can contribute
to undermine the power of central government to play an equalization role between
the various regions, thus giving rise to a more uneven distribution of resources across
space and greater spatial inequality (Prud’homme, 1995). Accordingly, the transfer
of fiscal power to subnational tiers of government mainly benefits the most prosper-
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ous regions, which are characterized in general by better socio-economic endowments
and higher institutional quality (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998). In view of this argu-
ment, the literature has tended to emphasize the spatial regressive effects of fiscal
decentralization.
There are, however, various reasons to suppose that decentralization may con-
tribute to reduce spatial inequality (McKinnon, 1997; Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008).
In the framework of the second generation models of fiscal federalism, for example,
Weingast (1995) and Qian and Weingast (1997) stress the role played in this con-
text by the incentive effects of regional competition following fiscal devolution. Given
that the ability of regional governments to stay in power depends decisively on their
performance in attaining a level of development and economic growth similar to that
registered by the rest of the country, the policy makers in poorer regions might attempt
to reduce their development gaps by offering more flexible labour markets and/or less
generous welfare provisions than richer regions. It is worth noting also that in cen-
tralized systems of government an important share of total investment often tends to
be located in the capital regions where political decision-making takes place. Nev-
ertheless, fiscal decentralization is characterized by a downsized central government
(Jin and Zou, 2002), which has the effect of drawing political power away from the
capital and its surrounding region. This contributes to the spatial spread of economic
activity, thus reducing regional disparities (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008).
As can be observed, the various arguments laid down above do not allow us to
determine a priori the final impact of the devolution of fiscal power from central to
subnational governments on the incidence of within-country conflict. In these circum-
stances empirical research is key to shed light on this issue. For this reason the rest
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of the paper is devoted to investigating the effect of fiscal decentralization on internal
conflict in a large cross-section of countries. At this point it is important to recall
that, as discussed in the introduction, there are few cross-country analyses to date
addressing the link between fiscal decentralization and intrastate conflict. Most of
the literature focuses on the role played in this context by political decentralization
(e.g. Gurr, 2000; Hechter 2000; Bermeo, 2002). Although some indicators of fiscal
decentralization are sometimes used (Brancati 2006), the conceptual and empirical dis-
cussion is mainly centred on political decentralization. Nevertheless, there are some
exceptions. Thus, Bakke and Wibbels (2006) and Tranchant (2010) examine why
the effects of fiscal decentralization on civil violence may vary in different countries.
In particular, Bakke and Wibbels (2006) show in a sample of 22 federal states that
the impact of fiscal decentralization depends ultimately on the interactions between
the federal institutions, regional disparities and the degree of ethnic diversity in the
society. In particular, these authors find that fiscal decentralization leads to ethnic
violence in countries with high levels of interregional inequality, while copartisanship
between central and subnational tiers of government reduces the risk of conflict. In
turn, Tranchant (2010), using data on 50 minority groups, highlights the relevance in
this context of institutional quality, and the different effect of fiscal decentralization
on local majorities and local minorities.1
1In a recent study, Farzanegan et al. (2013) investigate how the abundance of natural resources affects
the risk of internal conflict and how the federal structure of the state influences on this relationship.
Although the analysis of the connection between fiscal decentralization and conflict is not the main aim
of these authors, their findings suggest that the link between fiscal devolution and internal stability is
not robust.
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3 Measuring decentralization and internal conflict
Our research requires comparable and homogeneous data on the degree of fiscal de-
centralization in the various countries. It should be recalled, however, that the devo-
lution of fiscal power from central to regional and local governments is a complex and
multidimensional process (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Ezcurra, 2010), and that no single indicator is able to adequately capture the real level
of fiscal decentralization of a country (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). In order to maximize
the number of countries and the study period, I use two standard measures of fiscal
decentralization: the subnational share in total government expenditure, and the sub-
national share in total government revenue. The dataset compiled by the World Bank
and based on the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics provides information on these
indicators for a maximum of 105 countries over the period 1972-2000.2 Using aver-
age values, expenditure (revenue) decentralization in this sample ranges from 1.53%
(1.10%) to 61.23% (66.14%), which confirms that the degree of fiscal devolution varies
considerably across the different countries.
Despite the fact that these measures are the most widely used indicators in the
literature on the effects of fiscal decentralization (e.g. Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Fisman
and Gatti, 2002; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007), they are not free of criticisms.
Thus, these measures fail to differentiate between tax and non-tax revenue sources,
and for their inability to capture the proportion of intergovernmental transfers that
are discretionary or conditional. Most importantly, these indicators are based exclu-
sively on the distribution of expenditure and revenue responsabilities, but they provide
no information about the degree of autonomy of subnational governments (Ebel and
2See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm (May 2013).
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Yilmaz, 2002). For large cross-country comparisons, as Rodrg´uez-Pose and Ezcurra
(2010) acknowledge, there is nevertheless a lack of reliable alternatives, making these
measures the best available quantitative indicators on the level of fiscal decentraliza-
tion (see also Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill (2004)).
In order to overcome some of the problems of using these measures as our proxies
for the level of fiscal decentralization of the various cuntries, and to provide a more
comprehensive picture of the actual powers of subnational governments, I introduce
in the analysis an indicator of the level of political decentralization. In particular, I
employ a measure proposed by Treisman (2008) to capture decision-making decentral-
ization and based on the degree of autonomy of subnational governments in certain
areas. This is a binary variable that takes the value one if, under constitution, sub-
national legislatures have autonomy in certain specified areas not explicitly subject
to central laws, zero otherwise. Using the information provided by national constitu-
tions, Treisman (2008) compiles this indicator for a total of 129 countries around the
mid 1990s. The correlation coefficients between this measure of political autonomy
and the two indicators of fiscal decentralization described above are respectively 0.199
(p-value = 0.068) and 0.149 (p-value = 0.171), which suggests that the correspondence
is far from being perfect. In any case, the relatively low values of the correlation co-
efficients between political and fiscal decentralization observed in our sample should
allow us to identify the individual effects on internal stability of our proxies for fiscal
and political decentralization.
In order to conduct the analysis, I also need to quantify the incidence of civil
conflicts in the various countries. To that end I resort to the information provided
by the UCDP/PRIO dataset. This dataset is the result of a collaborative project
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between the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and
the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute
located in Oslo.3 The UCDP/PRIO data, which are described in detail by Gleditsch
et al. (2002), have been frequently used in recent years by numerous researchers and
policy makers (e.g. Østby et al., 2009; Deiwiks et al., 2012; Esteban et al., 2012).
Armed conflicts are defined according to this source as “a contested incompatibility
that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between
two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties,
at least one has to be the government of a state” (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010, p.
508).
Ideally, one would like to have data on the total number of deaths per year in order
to capture the degree of intensity of civil conflicts. However, available information
about the number of death tolls is quite limited and unreliable. For this reason, I
follow the convention in the literature and employ a yearly binary indicator defined
according to a threshold based on the number of casualties. Given the nature of the
study, I am interested in all conflicts included in the UCDP/PRIO dataset. Therefore,
I take as baseline a variable which reports all conflicts with 25 or more battle-related
deaths in a year (PRIO25). That is, in our analysis a country is recorded as having
experienced a civil armed conflict in a given year if this threshold of death tolls has
been met. This allows us to include in the study small and intermediate conflict
episodes.
Figure 1 shows the number of civil conflicts that fulfil the above criterion between
1972 and 2000. The graph shows clearly that the global trend in within-country
3For further details see http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/ (May 2013).
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conflicts has not been uniform throughout the study period. The maximum number
of civil conflicts was reached at the beginning of the 1990s and was the result of the
steady and gradual accumulation of conflicts since the mid 1970s. Coinciding with
the end of the Cold War, the incidence of civil conflicts decreased slightly. This seems
to suggest that the increase in the incidence of internal violence in some countries
associated with the Soviet collapse was offset by improved management strategies by
states and international organizations (Gurr, 2000). In any case, Figure 1 reveals that
in 2000 there were still 26 ongoing conflict events all over the world, which implies
that around one in seven countries was affected by internal conflict.4
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 The model
In this section I investigate the relationship between the devolution of fiscal power
from central to subnational governments and the incidence of internal armed conflicts
in 77 countries over the period 1972-2000. To that end, I estimate different versions
of the following model:
Cit = α+ βFDi,t−1 + γPDi,t−1 + δ
′
Xi,t−1 + εit (1)
4It is interesting to note that the basic pattern in Figure 1 is observed in a broad range of other data
sets on civil wars (e.g. Sambanis, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
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where C is a binary variable that takes a value of one if a civil armed conflict occurred
in country i during year t and zero otherwise, FD and PD are respectively the mea-
sures of fiscal and political decentralization, X is a set of variables that control for
additional factors that are assumed to have an influence on internal conflict, and ε is
the corresponding disturbance term. The main interest throughout the paper lies on
the coefficient β, which measures the impact of the degree of fiscal decentralization
on the incidence of intrastate conflict.
The control variables included in vector X have been selected on the basis of
existing studies on the explanatory factors of civil conflict (e.g. Collier and Hoe-
fler, 1998, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban et al., 2012). Considering the findings of this literature,
I take as the baseline specification of model (1) the following set of controls: GDP
per capita, population size, degree of fractionalization and ethnic polarization, per-
centage of mountainous terrain, non-contiguity of country territory, natural resource
abundance, democracy, a time dummy for the Cold War period, and the existence of
episodes of internal conflict in preceding years.5
According to economic theories of conflict and civil war, the level of development
plays a key role in this context (Newman, 1991). As is usual, I use GDP per capita to
capture existing differences in development across the sample countries. This variable
can be interpreted as a proxy for “a state’s overall financial, administrative, police and
military capabilities” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 80). This suggests that rebels can
expect a greater probability of success in low income countries. Moreover, a higher
level of GDP per capita implies a greater opportunity cost of engaging in a civil confict
5The Appendix provides detailed information on the definitions and sources of the different control
variables.
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(Collier and Hoefler, 2004).
Population size is also important in this context because the number of potential
rebels that can be recruited by the insurgents is greater in larger countries, whereas the
government of these countries must face more difficulties to exercise its authority and
keep the control at the local level (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Furthermore,
as is usual in the literature, the threshold used to define the dependent variable of
model (1) is not normalized by the population of the country in question, which tends
to bias civil conflicts in favour of larger countries (Esteban et al., 2012). The inclusion
of the population control in the list of regressors of model (1) allows one to overcome
this problem. In addition, this variable is positively associated with the level of spatial
inequality registered within the various countries (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010).
This is potentially important in our context because, as discussed in section 2, spatial
inequality may be correlated with both internal conflict and fiscal decentralization
(Østby et al., 2009; Deiwiks et al., 2012).
Ethnic cleavages are commonly perceived as an important cause of internal conflict.
This is based on the belief that ethnically diverse societies often register a greater de-
gree of violence (Horowitz, 1985; Esteban et al., 2012). In order to capture the degree
of ethnic heterogeneity within the sample countries I use two complementary mea-
sures. Following the usual approach in the literature, I include in vector X a standard
index of ethnic fractionalization. However, some scholars suggest that there is less
ethnic violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, whereas
the intensity of internal conflict is greater in those societies where a large ethnic mi-
nority must face an ethnic majority (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). This means that
an index of polarization may capture the risk of potential ethnic conflict better than
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traditional indices of fractionalization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban
et al., 2012). For this reason, I include in the list of regressors of model (1) a measure
of ethnic polarization proposed by Esteban et al. (2012).6
Furthermore, geographical factors may also be related to the incidence of internal
conflict. Rough and mountainous terrain can be used by rebel groups to hide from
government forces. Likewise, the existence of a territorial base separated geographi-
cally from the country’s centre should favour insurgency and internal conflict (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).
Model (1) also includes a measure of the degree of natural resource abundance
based on Esteban et al. (2012). Numerous studies have highlighted the link between
natural resource abundance and violent civil conflicts (e.g. Ross, 2006; Brunnschweiler
and Bulte, 2009) Resource-rich countries are often characterized by land expropriation,
inadequate job opportunities and labour migration, which may breed social unrest
in different sectors of the society. Natural resource abundance may also increase the
potential gains of those officials who are in charge of the exploitation of such resources,
which may give rise to more corruption and poor governance (Ades and Di Tella, 1999).
In addition, natural resources may provide an important source of funding for rebel
forces, although the presence of resource rents may also increase the probability of
foreign intervention.
6The indices of fractionalization and polarization do not take into account the geographical distribu-
tion of ethnic groups within a country, which may be particularly important in the relationship between
ethnic cleavages and conflict (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). In view of this, I also considered the role played
in this context by ethnic segregation. To do so, I resorted to the two measures of ethnic segregation
calculated by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). Unfortunately, these measures are not available for an
important number of countries included in our analysis. As a robustness test, I checked using a reduced
sample that their inclusion in the list of regressors of model (1) does not affect the core results of the
paper. Indeed, none of these measures of ethnic segregation is significantly associated with internal
conflict.
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Furthermore, democracy may be related to the presence of internal conflict. Demo-
cratic states are generally characterized by less repression of minority groups and
by the observance and respect of civil and political rights of their citizens (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003). This suggests that in democratic societies, ethnopolitical groups
are more likely to adopt other strategies of protest rather than rebellion (Gurr,
2000). Therefore, democratic regimes are less likely to produce grievance and vio-
lence. By contrast, autocracies tend to be less stable than democracies. In fact, in non-
democratic states the regime transitions can increase the risk of conflict. Although the
relationship between democracy and conflict is complex (Collier and Rohner, 2008),
these arguments suggest that one should distinguish between democratic and non-
democratic countries in the sample.
Moreover, the information provided by Figure 1 seems to indicate that the number
of internal armed conflicts was greater during the Cold War. In view of this, I also
include in the list of regressors a time dummy to capture the potential effects of the
Cold War on the dependent variable. Finally, the incidence of civil conflicts is usually
affected by the existence of previous episodes of violence, so I follow Fearon and Laitin
(2003) or Esteban et al. (2012) and use lagged conflict as an additional control.
4.2 Results
I begin by examining the relationship between the subnational share in total gov-
ernment expenditure and intrastate conflict. To do so I consider different ways of
estimating model (1). Thus, given the binary nature of the dependent variable, the
first two columns of Table 1 show the results obtained when the conflict equation is
estimated using respectively probit and logit regression. In turn, in the third column
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I employ the procedure suggested by King and Zeng (2001) to correct for the bias
created in a logit model for the reduced number of conflict observations relative to the
total.7 In all cases the corresponding p-values (in parentheses) are calculated using
robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
The information provided by Table 1 reveals that the relationship between the sub-
national share in total government expenditure and internal conflict does not depend
on the specific method used to estimate model (1). In particular, the coefficient of the
measure of fiscal decentralization is negative and statistically significant in all cases,
regardless of the estimation strategy. This means that a higher degree of expenditure
decentralization is associated with a lower risk of civil armed conflict. It should be
noted that this result is not affected by the inclusion in the analysis of the level of
political autonomy of subnational governments. In fact, although the coefficient of
our proxy for the degree of political decentralization is also negative, it is far from
being statistically significant at conventional levels. This seems to suggest that the
level of regional autonomy does not affect conflict.8 Nevertheless, this result should
be treated with some caution because we cannot rule out the possibility that the
statistical insignificance of this variable is caused by a constitution-based definition
of political autonomy which may have little relevance in a real-life political economy
context.
7The number of conflict observations in the sample is around 17%.
8I also considered the role played in this context by an alternative, weaker measure of political auton-
omy of subnational governments proposed by Treisman (2008) that captures if subnational governments
have powers to legislate in areas not explicitly assigned to other levels (“residual autonomy”). The
results obtained when this variable is included in the conflict equation are very similar to those just
described.
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Overall the estimates in Table 1 reveal a negative correlation between fiscal de-
centralization and internal conflict. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the
presence of an internal conflict may lead countries to modify their degree of decen-
tralization (Brancati, 2006; Tranchant, 2010). Consequently, the processes of fiscal
decentralization may affect intrastate conflicts and, in turn, be affected by them, giv-
ing rise to a reverse causality problem. This issue is potentially important from an
econometric perspective, but it could be solved if we had a suitable instrument for fis-
cal decentralization. Such an instrument must not be correlated with the disturbance
process in model (1), but at the same time must be an important factor in account-
ing for the variation in the dependent variable. Finding instruments that fulfil these
conditions in the context of our study is not easy. The standard instruments for fiscal
decentralisation employed in the literature are country size or the degree of ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization (Arikan, 2004; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Sepulveda
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Nevertheless, as discussed above, these factors are ex-
pected to be directly correlated with the incidence of internal conflict. For this reason,
model (1) already includes these variables in the list of regressors. Faced with this
difficulty, I follow Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) and use two year lagged values
of the measure of fiscal decentralization as instrument.9 This allows us to estimate the
conflict equation using an instrumental variable probit model based on a conditional
maximum-likelihood estimator (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006).
The results obtained when this estimation strategy is applied to investigate the
link between decentralization and conflict are presented in the fourth column of Table
9I also repeated the estimations using longer lags, since longer lags should reduce any potential cor-
relation between fiscal decentralization and the disturbance term in model (1). Nevertheless, the results
were in all cases very similar to those discussed in the paper. For further details on the employment of
lagged values of the explanatory variables as instruments, see Barro (2000).
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1. Focussing on the aim of the paper, it is important to note that the coefficient of the
measure of fiscal decentralization continues to be negative and statistically significant.
This confirms that fiscal decentralization reduces the incidence of internal conflict,
which constitutes the main empirical finding of the paper. To get an idea of the
quantitative importance of the impact of fiscal decentralization on intrastate conflict,
we can use the estimates in the last column of Table 1 to compute the corresponding
marginal effect. This marginal effect shows that a 20% increase in the subnational
share of total government expenditure from the average of 21.66% is associated with
a 4% decrease in the risk of internal conflict. Although in principle this impact might
seem modest, it should be taken into account by policy makers in designing and
developing effective conflict prevention strategies.
With respect to the control variables included in model (1), the information pro-
vided by Table 1 reveals that the results are in general consistent with the findings
of the existing literature on the determinants of internal armed conflicts. Thus, the
estimates show that civil violence is more likely in larger countries. Likewise, the in-
dex of fractionalization has a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable,
thus indicating that ethnic diversity is a relevant factor in explaining the existence
of intrastate conflicts. Furthermore, the non-contiguity of a country territory is also
related to higher rates of civil conflict. Additionally, the analysis shows that inter-
nal violence is more likely in those countries affected in the past by a civil conflict.
The coefficients of the remaining controls are not statistically significant consistently
across the various regressions included in Table 1, which may have to do with the
employment in the analysis of clustered standard errors.
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In order to examine whether the negative link between fiscal decentralization and
civil conflict is robust, the analysis presented in Table 1 is repeated using the subna-
tional share in total government revenue as the proxy for the degree of fiscal decen-
tralization in the sample countries. The results are shown in Table 2. In all cases the
existence of intrastate violence is less likely in countries with relatively high levels of
revenue decentralization, while the coefficient of the measure of political autonomy
is not statistically significant in any of the regressions. Likewise, the effects of the
remaining explanatory variables included in our baseline specification are very similar
to those described above.
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
I now check to what extent these results are sensitive to the inclusion of regional
dummies. To that end, I add to the list of regressors of model (1) four dummies for
countries in the most conflictual regions of the world during the study period: Sub-
Saharan Africa, Middle East, Asia and Latin America. As reported in the first column
of Tables 3 and 4, the inclusion of these regional dummies does not affect the observed
relationship between fiscal decentralization and internal conflict. In addition, columns
2-5 of Tables 3 and 4 show the results obtained when different estimations of model
(1) are carried out excluding the countries in these regions in turn. This exercise
allows us to investigate whether the results are driven by particular countries that
can be considered more conflictual. The estimates indicate that the coefficients of the
measures of fiscal decentralization continue to be negative and statistically significant
in all cases, corroborating the previous findings.
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[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
As mentioned above, the dependent variable in model (1) is a binary variable that
reports all conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths in a year (PRIO25). The
observed negative association between fiscal decentralization and internal conflict,
however, may be contingent on the choice of this specific threshold of deaths. For
this reason, as an additional robustness check, I now examine to what extent the
results in Table 1 depend on the definition of civil conflict used to construct the
dependent variable in model (1). To this end, I employ an alternative indicator based
on UCDP/PRIO data that takes into account whether the conflict has exceeded 1,000
battle-related deaths throughout its course (PRIOCW). More specifically, a conflict
is coded as zero as long as it has not resulted over time in more than 1,000 battle-
related casualties. Once a conflict reaches this threshold is coded as one. Unlike the
dependent variable used so far, PRIOCW allows us to focus our attention exclusively
on intermediate and high-intensity conflicts (i.e. civil wars). Columns 1 and 2 of Table
5 show the results obtained when PRIOCW is used to quantify the incidence of civil
conflict in model (1). As can be checked, this change has little effect on the main
findings of the paper. More specifically, the estimates reveal that the coefficients of
the measures of fiscal decentralization remain negative and statistically significant.
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
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At this point it should be recalled that the information to construct the two de-
pendent variables employed in the analysis performed so far were drawn from the
UCDP/PRIO dataset. In view of this, one may wonder if the results could be af-
fected by the use of this particular dataset. In order to investigate this issue, I resort
to the data employed by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2003),
who constructed two alternative lists of conflicts based on the information provided
by the Correlates of War (COW) project and other sources.10 Doyle and Sambanis
(2000) report conflicts that: “(a) it caused more than 1,000 deaths; (b) it challenged
the sovereignty of an international recognized state; (c) it occurred within the recog-
nized boundary of that state; (d) it involves the state as a principal combatant; (e)
it included rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state;
and (f) the parties were concerned with the prospects of living together in the same
political unit after the end of the war”. In turn, the definition of conflict proposed by
Fearon and Laitin (2003) is based on the following criteria: (a) it should involve “the
fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups
who sought either to take control of a government, take power in a region, or use
violence to change government policies; (b) the conflict killed or has killed at least
1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100 deaths; (c) at least 100 were
killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels)”. Columns 3-6 of Table 5
report the results obtained when the baseline model is estimated again using the data
provided by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) to construct the
dependent variable. The estimates reveal that the main results of the paper remain
unaltered. In particular, the coefficients of the measures of fiscal decentralization still
hold negative and statistically significant, thus corroborating the robustness of our
10See Sambanis (2004) for further details about the COW civil war data.
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findings.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the relationship between fiscal decentralization and internal
armed conflict in a panel of 77 countries during the period 1972-2000. The results
show that the devolution of fiscal power to subnational tiers of government reduces
the incidence of civil conflict. This finding is robust to the inclusion in the analysis of
the degree of political decentralization and of a number of control variables commonly
employed in the literature. Likewise, the observed relationship does not depend on
the estimation strategy or the specific measures used to quantify the degree of fiscal
decentralization and the incidence of civil conflicts within the various countries.
In the context of the global trend towards decentralization currently underway,
an important number of countries located in some of the most conflictual regions
in the world have undergone in recent years different transformations increasing the
levels of autonomy of subnational tiers of government (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Gill, 2003;
Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). This is, for example, the case of Asian countries
such as China, Indonesia, the Philippines or Vietnam. This trend can also be oberved
in Latin America, where many of the countries that were decentralized on paper
have experienced important changes in the relations between the central government
and the various regions. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, considered traditionally as a
strong bastion of centralism, numerous countries have undertaken different transfers
of powers and resources to subnational tiers of government (Ndegwa, 2002). Against
this background, our results provide empirical evidence on the importance of fiscal
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decentralization for managing intrastate conflict, which should be taken into account
by policy makers at the national level and by regional and international organizations.
Nevertheless, the nature of our analysis implies that any policy implication should be
treated with caution. In particular, the results of the paper should not be used to
justify the idea that fiscal decentralization can be a one-size-fits-all solution to the
different forms of intrastate conflict.
Additional extensions to our work are not difficult to conceive. Some relate di-
rectly to the enlargement of the number of countries included in the sample. Lack
of adequate data on decentralization has prevented us from pursuing this issue, but
addressing it may provide a more complete picture about the nature of the link be-
tween fiscal devolution and internal conflict. Likewise, it would be important to have
alternative measures of fiscal decentralization available for large cross-country com-
parisons in order to capture adequately the multidimensional nature of the processes
of decentralization. Further research will also have to pay special attention to the
need to identify and study the various theoretical mechanisms which explain in the
final instance the influence of fiscal devolution on civil conflict. Only by pursuing
these strands we will be able to attain a more complete understanding about how
fiscal decentralization affects intrastate violence.
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Appendix
List of countries
Albania
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Congo-Brazzaville
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Senegal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
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Spain
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Trinidad
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Control variables: Definitions and sources
GDP per capita: Natural log of GDP per capita expressed in constant 2005
international dollars. Source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
Population: Natural log of total population (thousands of people). Source: Penn
World Tables 7.0.
Fractionalization: Index of ethnic fractionalization defined as F =
∑m
i=1 ni(1 −
ni), where ni is the population share of group i. Source: Esteban et al. (2012).
Polarization: Index of ethnic polarization defined as P =
∑m
i=1
∑m
j=1 n
2
injkij ,
with kij = 1−s0.05ij . ni is the population share of group i, and sij is the degree of
similarity between two languages, given by the ratio of the number of common
branches to the maximum possible number for the entire tree. Source: Esteban
et al. (2012).
Mountainous terrain: Percentage of mountainous terrain. The variable is ex-
pressed in natural logs as log(1 +mount). Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Non-contiguous state: Dummy variable that takes the value one for those coun-
tries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land
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area containing the capital city either by land or by 100 kilometers of water, zero
otherwise. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Democracy: Institutionalized democracy. Democracy ranges from zero (low)
to ten (high) (Polity IV Project). Using this information a dummy variable is
constructed to identify those countries where the democracy score is higher than
or equal to four (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Source: Esteban et al.
(2012).
Natural resources: Oil-diamond dummy, which takes the value one if the country
is “rich in oil” or produces (any positive quantity of) diamonds, zero otherwise.
A country is “rich in oil” if the average value of its oil production in a period
is greater than 100 US dollars in 2000 constant dollars. Source: Esteban et al.
(2012).
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Number of internal conflicts from 1972 to 2000.
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Table 1: The relationship between expenditure decentralization and internal conflict.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method Probit Logit RE-Logit IV-Probit
Expenditure decentralization -0.023*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
Politcal autonomy -0.130 -0.411 -0.368 -0.184
(0.516) (0.332) (0.380) (0.403)
GDP per capita -0.102 -0.205 -0.188 -0.027
(0.253) (0.221) (0.256) (0.776)
Population 0.340*** 0.710*** 0.670*** 0.377***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fractionalization 0.999** 2.409*** 2.352*** 1.504***
(0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Polarization -0.600 -1.597 -1.360 0.300
(0.636) (0.588) (0.641) (0.817)
Mountainous terrain -0.085 -0.203 -0.206 -0.102
(0.219) (0.209) (0.198) (0.129)
Non-contiguous state 0.293* 0.612* 0.593* 0.343**
(0.076) (0.065) (0.071) (0.037)
Natural resources 0.181 0.495 0.510 -0.080
(0.523) (0.383) (0.364) (0.759)
Democracy 0.179 0.464 0.430 0.208
(0.297) (0.195) (0.225) (0.276)
Cold War 0.220 0.443 0.425 0.383**
(0.174) (0.161) (0.174) (0.018)
Prior conflict 2.806*** 5.080*** 4.795*** 2.791***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -4.464*** -9.033*** -8.610*** -5.829***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo-R2 0.732 0.731 . .
Countries 76 76 76 73
Observations 1155 1155 1155 1062
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases PRIO25. p-values are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level have been employed to
compute z-statistics. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at
1% level. See the main text for further details on the estimation methods.
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Table 2: The relationship between revenue decentralization and internal conflict.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method Probit Logit RE-Logit IV-Probit
Revenue decentralization -0.023** -0.053** -0.050** -0.029***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.001)
Politcal autonomy -0.153 -0.470 -0.420 -0.184
(0.457) (0.282) (0.330) (0.411)
GDP per capita -0.130 -0.272 -0.248 -0.063
(0.168) (0.133) (0.165) (0.525)
Population 0.313*** 0.665*** 0.629*** 0.346***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fractionalization 0.928** 2.220*** 2.175** 1.393***
(0.029) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005)
Polarization -0.561 -1.968 -1.771 0.371
(0.653) (0.494) (0.534) (0.768)
Mountainous terrain -0.063 -0.163 -0.165 -0.070
(0.350) (0.295) (0.283) (0.281)
Non-contiguous state 0.248 0.499 0.479 0.284*
(0.157) (0.162) (0.176) (0.100)
Natural resources 0.254 0.669 0.671 0.016
(0.357) (0.220) (0.214) (0.949)
Democracy 0.166 0.479 0.440 0.225
(0.316) (0.173) (0.205) (0.226)
Cold War 0.230 0.469 0.453 0.405**
(0.152) (0.130) (0.139) (0.010)
Prior conflict 2.799*** 5.057*** 4.775*** 2.785***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -4.094*** -8.237*** -7.894*** -5.355***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo-R2 0.730 0.729 . .
Countries 77 77 77 74
Observations 1159 1159 1159 1062
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases PRIO25. p-values are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level have been employed to
compute z-statistics. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at
1% level. See the main text for further details on the estimation methods.
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Table 3: Robustness analysis: Regional dummies and influential regions (I). Instrumen-
tal variable probit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expenditure decen. -0.024** -0.024** -0.021** -0.025*** -0.033***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Political autonomy -0.001 -0.432* 0.002 -0.227 -0.108
(0.223) (0.250) (0.251) (0.286) (0.287)
GDP per capita -0.303*** -0.139 -0.193*** 0.145 -0.061
(0.111) (0.104) (0.073) (0.153) (0.097)
Population 0.469*** 0.310*** 0.476*** 0.295*** 0.436***
(0.090) (0.080) (0.071) (0.087) (0.088)
Fractionalization 1.126* 2.664*** 0.868* 1.930*** 1.457***
(0.583) (0.808) (0.471) (0.651) (0.480)
Polarization 0.901 -2.069 2.030 -0.639 -1.556
(1.632) (1.924) (1.257) (1.962) (1.283)
Mountainous terrain -0.132 -0.131 -0.079 -0.045 -0.101
(0.084) (0.082) (0.087) (0.074) (0.088)
Non-contiguous state 0.690*** 0.429** 0.577*** 0.239 0.235
(0.229) (0.217) (0.179) (0.262) (0.184)
Natural resources -0.769* -0.251 -0.295 -0.175 0.434
(0.422) (0.306) (0.393) (0.317) (0.270)
Democracy 0.159 0.097 0.032 0.035 0.580*
(0.188) (0.194) (0.191) (0.214) (0.302)
Cold War 0.350* 0.372* 0.459** 0.291 0.528***
(0.205) (0.202) (0.201) (0.218) (0.188)
Prior conflict 2.614*** 2.581*** 2.548*** 2.871*** 2.741***
(0.239) (0.285) (0.239) (0.327) (0.325)
Constant -4.355*** -4.177*** -5.532*** -6.688*** -6.238***
(1.240) (1.285) (1.079) (1.179) (1.022)
Regional dummies Yes No No No No
Excluded region None Sub-Saha- Middle Asia Latin
ran Africa East America
Countries 73 61 67 62 62
Observations 1062 921 992 927 887
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases PRIO25. p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level have been employed to compute z-
statistics. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: Robustness analysis: Regional dummies and influential regions (II). Instru-
mental variable probit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Revenue decen. -0.030** -0.025** -0.028*** -0.021** -0.033***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Political autonomy 0.012 -0.401 0.016 -0.257 -0.168
(0.221) (0.258) (0.249) (0.288) (0.285)
GDP per capita -0.371*** -0.158 -0.236*** 0.120 -0.092
(0.115) (0.103) (0.077) (0.160) (0.107)
Population 0.457*** 0.278*** 0.468*** 0.253*** 0.378***
(0.085) (0.077) (0.062) (0.087) (0.083)
Fractionalization 1.031* 2.531*** 0.748 1.884*** 1.413***
(0.590) (0.806) (0.479) (0.661) (0.480)
Polarization 1.087 -1.963 2.195* -0.937 -1.112
(1.642) (1.954) (1.201) (1.921) (1.157)
Mountainous terrain -0.106 -0.092 -0.056 -0.011 -0.041
(0.082) (0.078) (0.085) (0.071) (0.084)
Non-contiguous state 0.641*** 0.375* 0.522*** 0.213 0.181
(0.221) (0.212) (0.185) (0.277) (0.200)
Natural resources -0.712* -0.188 -0.170 -0.070 0.506*
(0.423) (0.316) (0.378) (0.307) (0.269)
Democracy 0.228 0.100 0.094 -0.018 0.571**
(0.194) (0.181) (0.196) (0.216) (0.281)
Cold War 0.373* 0.378* 0.498** 0.325 0.525***
(0.207) (0.194) (0.199) (0.209) (0.187)
Prior conflict 2.584*** 2.577*** 2.516*** 2.888*** 2.776***
(0.239) (0.291) (0.236) (0.331) (0.330)
Constant -3.743*** -3.866*** -5.172*** -6.269*** -5.673***
(1.173) (1.235) (1.056) (1.194) (1.037)
Regional dummies Yes No No No No
Excluded region None Sub-Saha- Middle Asia Latin
ran Africa East America
Countries 74 61 68 63 63
Observations 1062 917 994 927 889
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases PRIO25. p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level have been employed to compute z-
statistics. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 5: Robustness analysis: Alternative measures of conflict. Instrumental variable
probit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable PRIOCW PRIOCW Doyle- Doyle- Fearon- Fearon-
Sambanis Sambanis Laitin Laitin
(2000) (2000) (2003) (2003)
Exp. decen. -0.034** -0.044*** -0.058***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.022)
Rev. decen. -0.046*** -0.053** -0.053**
(0.016) (0.021) (0.022)
Pol. autonomy -0.313 -0.321 0.004 -0.043 0.580 0.521
(0.332) (0.330) (0.316) (0.329) (0.358) (0.340)
GDP per capita -0.080 -0.149* -0.249** -0.319* -0.450*** -0.506***
(0.075) (0.088) (0.121) (0.165) (0.169) (0.183)
Population 0.379*** 0.370*** 0.320*** 0.261*** 0.641*** 0.579***
(0.083) (0.072) (0.105) (0.087) (0.215) (0.195)
Fractionalization 1.230*** 1.061** 1.427** 1.241** 0.448 0.068
(0.475) (0.463) (0.580) (0.502) (0.784) (0.678)
Polarization 0.039 -0.148 -1.332 -1.676 0.851 1.086
(1.538) (1.429) (1.652) (1.573) (2.375) (2.317)
Mount. -0.108 -0.079 -0.064 -0.032 -0.188 -0.171
(0.091) (0.085) (0.096) (0.081) (0.160) (0.155)
Non-contig. 0.201 0.116 0.232 0.244 0.150 0.201
(0.173) (0.193) (0.229) (0.248) (0.358) (0.348)
Nat. resources 0.103 0.283 0.066 0.206 0.841* 1.065**
(0.258) (0.273) (0.297) (0.311) (0.499) (0.474)
Democracy 0.376* 0.487** 1.036*** 1.002*** 1.006** 0.804**
(0.227) (0.248) (0.378) (0.388) (0.449) (0.394)
Cold War 0.437* 0.442* 0.352** 0.387* 0.388** 0.496*
(0.236) (0.237) (0.179) (0.210) (0.196) (0.268)
Prior conflict 3.492*** 3.478*** 3.751*** 3.674*** 4.110*** 3.859***
(0.268) (0.266) (0.283) (0.251) (0.436) (0.308)
Constant -5.620*** -5.029*** -4.043*** -2.975** -5.084*** -4.125***
(1.186) (1.121) (1.050) (1.230) (1.489) (1.394)
Countries 73 74 73 74 73 74
Observations 1062 1062 1038 1038 1038 1038
Notes: p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country
level have been employed to compute z-statistics. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, ***
significant at 1% level.
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